



For  a  reason  that  might  be  connected  to  the  theme  of  my  paper,
Nietzsche’s philosophy has rarely been criticised in a way that would
address  his  basic,  moral  ideas.   Of  course,  some  would  probably
protest at the suggestion that Nietzsche had any basic moral ideas in
the typical sense.  In the present paper, I will show that Nietzsche had
a  quite  ordinary,  basically  Kantian,  view  of  ethics.   His  central,
philosophical task: to re-value all higher values, indicates this.  As I
see it, ordinary – which means: collective – ethics is an ethics of value
and  normativity.   Values  found  norms,  and  normativity  establishes
normality.  Re-valuing values is thus to stay within ordinary ethics.
The  core  of  Nietzsche’s  critique  against  the  values  that  have
determined philosophy and morality is that they, since Socrates, have
constituted a "no" to life.  Such a no to life is characteristic of what he
calls slave-morality, which culminates in Christianity.  I will show that
Nietzsche,  after  all,  shares  the basic  features  of  this  morality.   My
critique of Nietzsche’s moral ideas will  thus at the same time be a
criticism  of  some  very  general,  common  views  of  morality.1
Nietzsche’s  ethics  does  not  differ  in  any  substantial  way  from
common views.  They just reach a higher pitch in his thought.  I will
also show that what Nietzsche takes to be his special, philosophical
gift, is part of the negativity that he takes himself to be criticising.
Christianity,  particularly  Protestantism,  is  in  Nietzsche’s  view  a
terrible and insidious denial of life: "Christianity, that  denial of the
will to  life become religion!" (EH 91).  And as he also puts it: "the
cross as the distinguishing mark of the most subterranean conspiracy
ever heard of – against health, beauty, well-being, intellect, kindness
of soul – against life itself (AC 91)."
This is a familiar Nietzschean theme of course.  The character of this
theme is, perhaps a bit surprisingly, quite closely related to the way in
1 But, someone might ask, why would "general, common views" be reducible to Kantianism? Short answer: 
Kantianism expresses the morality of general views of morality, utilitarianism the political use of it, and 
virtue ethics its behavioural patterns.  
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which Nietzsche, according to himself, managed to unmask this truth
about Christianity.  Since he did not arrive at this truth either by way
of rational argument or moral reasoning, it is worthwhile to reflect at
the way he thought he had come to see this "crime against life", for it
was  this  alleged ability  that  made  him  able  to  start  unmasking
Christianity  –  an  event  which  seemed  to  him  to  be  a  catastrophe
without equal.  The task is obviously not an easy one:
Not to have opened its eyes here sooner counts to me as the
greatest  piece  of  uncleanliness  which  humanity  has  on  its
conscience,  as  self-deception  become  instinct,  as  a
fundamental  will  not to  observe  every  event,  every  cause,
every reality, as false-coinage in psychologicis to the point of
crime (EH 101).
Here we begin to see the magnitude of the problem, the denial,  at
hand: it is self-deception become instinct at a, well, global level.  We
also get an indication of the kind of problem we are dealing with, for
Nietzsche characterises it as uncleanliness.  But what is one to make
of the reference to conscience?  How does "not to have realised the
uncleanliness of something" become a matter of conscience – and, if
this needs specification, a matter of highest urgency?  And what does
it  mean  to  speak  about  the  conscience  of  humanity?   Or  does
Nietzsche mean the consciences of all human beings taken separately?
Further, if "Remorse of conscience is indecent" (TI 33) as he says in
another place, why is there any problem with having something on
one’s conscience?  It is a well known fact that Nietzsche thought that
having a conscience at all is indecent – it is a sickness to be cured
from.   
Whatever the case, what we are dealing with according to Nietzsche is
the "ghetto-world of the soul" that "Christian agitators" like St. 
Augustine, "filthy fellows", introduced into the world (AC 87).  It is 
this kind of rottenness; rottenness of soul-issues (Is he thinking of 
rotten souls? Or is "soul" that which is rotten?), that Nietzsche thought
he was the first one to detect.  How does one detect such rottenness?  
One needs to have what Nietzsche thought he had, an extraordinary 
decency:  
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It is my fate to have to be the first decent human being, to
know  myself  in  opposition  to  the  mendaciousness  of
millennia...I was the first to  discover the truth, in that I was
the first to sense – smell – the lie as lie...My genius is in my
nostrils...I contradict as has never been contradicted and am
none the less the opposite of a negative spirit. I am a bringer
of good tidings […] (EH 96)
This passage, which presumably is not in favour among 
postmodernists, gives us some indication of the "ghetto-world of the 
soul" that Nietzsche has in mind. But what rottenness, what lie, what 
self-deception become an instinct, is he thinking of? Generally 
speaking, he is talking about the rottenness of "Christian instincts".  
But what exactly are these and what is the smell that Nietzsche was 
the first one to sense?  What are the truths that his nose reveals?  
Truths that other philosophers have completely missed because they 
supposedly have lacked the nose requisite for discovering them.  In 
fact, Nietzsche does not speak about truths in the plural but about 
truth, The Truth.  It is the nose that leads Nietzsche to The Truth.  
Does it also lead us to the "good tidings" that he claims to deliver?
What kind of Truth is it that is revealed by the nose?  Is it a truth that
only the nose can perceive?  If this is the case, the above passage does
not tell us why truth is supposed to be like this, for there Nietzsche
says only that it is the lie as lie that is exposed by his nostrils.  But
surely lies can be detected in other ways too.  For instance, one can
hear  the  falseness  of  a  false  reasoning  or  see  through  deceptive
thinking.  So how should we understand The Truth that Nietzsche has
discovered?  There are several indications in Nietzsche’s work.  Let us
look  at  one  of  them.   It  communicates  distinctly  the  intensity  of
Nietzsche’s perception.  What Nietzsche states here comes just after
he has lamented on  the way the blond beast has been tamed into a
"household pet":  
– At this  juncture  I  cannot  suppress  a  sigh and one last
hope.  What  do  I  find  absolutely  intolerable?  Something
which I just cannot cope alone with and which suffocates me
and makes me feel faint? Bad air! Bad air! That something
failed comes near me, that I have to smell the bowels of a
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failed soul! . . . Apart from that, what cannot be borne in the
way of need, deprivation, bad weather, disease, toil, solitude?
Basically we can cope with everything else, born as we are to
an underground and battling existence [...] (GM 25)
Nietzsche cannot stand failed souls.  Let us for the moment set aside
the category of “failed souls”.  I feel a certain unease in my soul at the
thought of this categorization, but let me come back to this later on.
My  unease  is  not  about  anything  that,  in  any  sense  of  the  word,
smells; that is detectable by the nose.  Nor is it about anything that
shows  itself.   Not  even  anything,  that  whispers  in  my  ear.  Just  a
certain unease.  Let me however leave this issue for the moment and
instead focus on Nietzsche’s reaction.
Nietzsche claims in many places – just  as he does in the previous
quotation – that he is good at enduring suffering.  And without doubt
he was in some sense "dynamite".  Still, he cannot deal with the smell
of a failed soul – it makes him choke.  He cannot stand it on his own
(womit  ich  allein  nicht  fertig  werde).   Nietzsche  occasionally
confesses suffering from certain weaknesses but is this one of these
occasions?  Is he not rather explaining how he has been able to detect
the truth with capital T?  We are making contact with what Nietzsche
himself characterizes as his genius.  I want to attach attention to the
fact  that  when  Nietzsche  thinks  that  he  is  accessing  Truth,  in  this
"event without equal" (EH 103), he says that he cannot stand what
emerges, "the bowels of a failed soul", alone.  Whom does he long for
at this moment?  He certainly does not long for being part of some
heard.   May  be  he  longs  for  free  spirits?   “Free  spirits”  probably
would not want to see themselves as constituting any herd – quite the
contrary.  But do they not nevertheless constitute a “we”, a collectivity
of a certain kind?  A collectivity that is characterised by "a rebellious,
despotic,  volcanically  jolting  desire  to  roam  abroad,  to  become
alienated, cool, sober, icy: a hatred of love […]" (HH, 6).
Moreover, how can Nietzsche, who celebrates loneliness and scorns
need of other people, say that he faces something that he cannot cope
with alone?  We are obviously dealing with a very special case.  In this
connection, it is also important to see the crucial role of decency – and
I see no reason to add, "What Nietzsche calls decency".
4
It would be a typical move to draw the conclusion that what we have
here is Nietzsche’s tendency to fall into contradictions.  Another line
of thought would, by contrast, be to praise Nietzsche’s depth and make
claims about the inadequacy of the philosophical notions of truth and
coherence.  I will try to avoid both of these urges; urges that define
philosophy and that are in my view two aspects of the same confusion.
Or  rather:  different  distortions  caused  by  the  same  repression.
Moreover,  there  are  hardly  more  contradictions  and  paradoxes  in
Nietzsche’s thought than there is in, say, Kant’s. 
The Truth
No matter  how one  interprets  Nietzsche’s  concept  of  truth,  certain
confusing questions arise, confusions that do not go away even if one
would  not  fall  in  with Nietzsche’s  gender  stereotypes.   For  if,  as
Nietzsche says, truth is a woman (BGE ix), then he does not seem to
approach it in a very manly way.  Or was Nietzsche a transsexual?  We
need to leave this kind of tinkering with collective stereotypes,  for
they just deepen the confusion.
What smells is the lie; a lie that is said to deny life and find its deepest
hypocrisy in Christianity.   The odours of this lie is what Nietzsche
cannot stand – alone.   Given his perspectival  and local,  essentially
postmodern, notion of truth, and that he praises lying, one can wonder
why he becomes sick when facing a lie.  One has to assume that the lie
he has in mind is an unusual one.
At this point, placed before an idea of a philosophical Truth of the
grandest dimensions, I feel like asking: What became of Anti-Christ?
And of the pre-post-modernist?  Why did Nietzsche, precisely at this
point,  make  use  of  a  concept  of  big  truth?   It  is  also  here,  in
connection to this truth, that he states what it is that he cannot stand -
alone.  In making his statement, he lets out a sigh, a sigh that also
expresses "one last hope" and "confidence".
Whence the sigh?  Whence the impulse to suppress it?  What is the
hope about?  And what is it that disposes him not to suppress the sigh
but instead let it out?  Is the impulse to let out a sigh so overwhelming
that he cannot resist it?  Or is there a third factor – perhaps the hope? –
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which  allows  Nietzsche  to  re-interpret  the  sigh  so  that  it  becomes
bearable?  In that case, there would seem to be two moments in the
sigh:  The initial  stage that,  whatever  else  it  signified,  provoked an
impulse to suppress it, and the second stage that, after re-interpretation
was, figuratively, allowed to become audible.  What could these two
sighs signify?
I hope you forgive me my perhaps peculiar questions, but I cannot
help ("Cannot help" – how peculiar that it makes sense at all to speak
like this!) being curious about the kind of sigh that a philosopher, who
makes himself known as a truth-basher, hesitantly lets out at a moment
when he announces the arrival of a truth with capital T.            
We must obviously try to study both Nietzsche’s anxiety and hope and
their  possible  intersections  and even  dependences.   The  kind  of
anxiety  at  stake  clearly  must  have  a  striking weight.   The anxiety
presumably has a connection both to the truth that Nietzsche is about
to reveal and to the incapacity he is giving voice to, the incapacity to
endure alone the Truth that his nose reveals to him.  In fact, it appears
as if the grand truth would – strangely? - be a fruit of the incapacity.
Perhaps the company he longs for is also essential to the arrival of this
truth?  This would be exceptional in many ways, not least because of
Nietzsche’s  oft-stated  need  for  solitude  (for  instance  in  EH 18).  -
Anyway, we must now scrutinize the smell at stake for the Truth is in
the smell, or in the detection of it.
The Smell
Without yet saying anything about Nietzsche’s incapacity – if that is
the word to use – to deal with the smell, we can take note of the fact
that he speaks about a smell that arises in a certain closeness to others;
when others come close to him (in meine Nähe kommt):
May I venture to indicate one last trait of my nature which
creates for me no little difficulty in my relations with others?
I possess a perfectly uncanny sensitivity of the instinct for
cleanliness, so that I perceive physiologically –  smell – the
proximity or – what am I saying? - the innermost parts, the
‘entrails’,  of  every  soul...I  have  in  this  sensitivity
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psychological antennae with which I touch and take hold of
every secret: all the  concealed  dirt at the bottom of many a
nature […] (EH 18).
Here  it  becomes  clear  that  what  is  at  stake  is  not  merely  about
detecting  the  rottenness  of  Christianity,  nor  even  merely  about
detecting "failed" souls.  Nietzsche smells the proximity of every soul.
It is the proximity  that smells.  If someone comes too close  to him,
Nietzsche feels - "perceives physiologically" – the entrails of the soul
of that person.  What smells is,  he says, the concealed dirt,  "every
secret",  of  that  soul.   Does  this  mean  that  what  gives  Nietzsche
these...qualms?...is the soul itself?  If so, then Nietzsche prefigures the
modern psychologist and neuroscientist.
Anyway,  this  is  the  uncanny  sensitivity,  the  genius,  of  Nietzsche’s
nostrils.  And he makes it clear that he is not talking about being able
to distinguish a failed soul from a "healthy" one: "Disgust at mankind,
at the ’rabble’, has always been my greatest danger…(EH 19)."  He
obviously does not think that the failed souls constitute some kind of
unfortunate  exceptions  that  disturb  him.   It  is  mankind  itself  that
makes him sick.  Just as he says, it is "every soul" – if a human being
comes too close.  The following passage from Anti-Christ – and here
we meet the sigh again – makes the scope of Nietzsche’s disgust quite
clear:
I cannot, at this place, avoid a sigh. There are days when I
am visited by a feeling blacker than the blackest melancholy
–  contempt  of  man.  Let  me  leave  no  doubt  as  to  what  I
despise, whom  I despise: it is the man of today, the man with
whom I am unhappily contemporaneous. The man of today –
I am suffocated by his foul breath (AC 54)!
 Let us postpone the suspicion – or is it wishful thinking? - that these
passages show that discussing Nietzsche does not tell us much about
human  beings  in  general,  because  he  is  so  obviously  lacking  in
humanity.
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In  discussing  his  difficulty,  Nietzsche  points  out  that  "extreme
cleanliness"  is  a  presupposition  for  his  existence:  "I  perish  under
unclean  conditions"  (EH  18).   Nietzsche  tries  to  evoke  literal,
physiological, aspects of his cleanliness and he probably did connect
his claims about his spiritual cleanliness to his bodily cleanliness and
his liking for bathing and swimming.  He also speaks about his liking
for hiking high in the mountains in show and ice, as if to emphasise
his cleanliness and "purity".  In this connection he makes a quotation
from  Zarathustra.  The  quotation is  supposed  to  capture  his
"redemption  from  disgust".  Zarathustra  dwells  in  the  "extreme
heights"  of  the  mountains  where  the  coldness  repels  all  "unclean
men": "Their bodies and their spirits would call our happiness a cave
of ice!" (EH 19). Also, "[t]he ice is near, the solitude is terrible" for
those who are not made for it (EH 4).
"Our happiness"? - Yes, here we probably meet those "free spirits" in
whose  company  alone  Nietzsche  can  endure  the  smell  we  are
discussing.  However, he is a bit confused here, for in the company of
these free spirits there supposedly is – almost – no closeness and no
smell.  What he means is probably that when someone gets too close
to him,  the  thought of  (with an eye to  what  will  emerge it  my be
illuminating  to  say  even  concept  of)  these  cool  friends  helps  him
endure the situation.  I will come back to this cooling effect of the
friend, but let us for the moment stay with the smell itself – though
these two themes will merge.
We have seen that the smell seems to arise when people in general, not
some particularly failed souls, come "too close" to Nietzsche.  This
means that, for Nietzsche, it is the  closeness itself that is rotten; that
smells.   Now, since we today live in a  Zeitgeist,  by which I  mean
"collective  illusion", of  intimacy  and closeness,  it  might  seem that
what  Nietzsche  says is  very  far  from our  current  understanding of
human relationships.  This would be confused.
Nietzsche just expresses in his own way what people usually take to
be the “problem” of love: to find a friend that has the same sense of
distance and nearness as one has oneself.  Kant discusses this same
theme in terms of a balance between love, which he calls attraction,
and respect, which he calls repulsion (Kant 2000, 215).  In my view,
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Kant  here  unwittingly  describes  a  central  aspect  of  a  universal
dialectics of repression.  Kant notes that if one becomes "too close"
with  one’s  friend  it  could  become  the  end  of  the  friendship.   His
concern is highly relevant to understanding Nietzsche.  The dynamics
between  attraction  and  repulsion  that  Kant  discusses  is  the  same
dynamics that we find also in Nietzsche’s predicament.  Once this is
seen, Nietzsche’s worries appear to be quite ordinary and do not give
us any reason for taking them as signs of an unprecedented capacity of
revealing the Truth. On the other hand, Nietzsche’s worries reveal the
implausibility  of  Kant’s  account  –  and  indeed  also  all ordinary,
everyday accounts.  An understanding of love where this dynamics is
irrelevant would be one where a conception of human closeness and
engagement  is  in  no repressive way related  to  any conception that
includes a function of secretly distancing people from each other. In
other  words:  the  love-respect  dynamics  would  be  irrelevant  in  a
culture where the openness of love is not a problem.  - Now, let us
look at what Kant says.
For  Kant,  the  other  does  not  seem  to  be  as  repelling  as  it  is  to
Nietzsche.  Kant warns us of that "sweetness" of love that "approaches
fusion into one person" and the background to this warning is telling.
He asks namely, how a human being can
be sure that if the love of one is stronger, he may not, just
because of this,  forfeit  something of the  other's  respect,  so
that  it  will  be  difficult  for  both  to  bring  love  and  respect
subjectively  into that  equal  balance  required  for  friendship
(Kant 2000, 215)?
Without going to the oddities in Kant’s thought here2, we must ask
what the relation is between Nietzsche’s disgust and Kant’s dangerous
sweetness.
It is important to pay attention to the fact that Nietzsche is not simply
indifferent to people, for other human beings have the most profound
"effect"  on him.   And in fact  Nietzsche  admits  some of  this  quite
2The problems in Kant’s thought are no smaller than those in Nietzsche: for instance, earlier in the same work
(p. 163) Kant quite efficiently rejected Aristotle’s idea of virtue as a mean between two vices. Love and respect
are presumably not vices according to Kant, but  why would Aristotle’s idea work any better with two virtues?
And why is it even needed with virtues?
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explicitly: "[M]y humanity consists,  not  in feeling for and with man,
but in enduring that I do feel for and with him...(EH 18)"
This is in fact a striking statement.  When one considers  it, one sees
that the difference between Nietzsche’s disgust and Kant’s sweetness
becomes unimportant.  The sweetness will according to Kant tempt us
to  become "too close"  with  the  other  and this  will  lead to  loss  of
respect for the other.  Kant does not  explicitly  say that if one loses
one’s respect for the other one will feel disgust for her, but it is clear
that this is what he means.  He says for instance that if one deprives
oneself of one’s duties to oneself one makes oneself into an "object of
contempt", to a "loathsome object" (Kant 2000, 175, 179).  So behind,
or is it before?, sweetness, disgust lies in wait.
What Nietzsche says indicates that he cannot help feeling for others.
According to  Kant  it  would  seem,  that  it  is  Nietzsche’s  loathsome
lustfulness,  the  supposed  "sweetness"  of  which  tempts  him  to
becoming too close with people, and then feel disgust for them. I think
that this account is outright incredible as an account of love.  Rather, it
seems to be an account of an emotion that has its origin in a repression
of love.  I am thinking of a repression that occurs in connection to
sexual behaviour, when one person feels disgust at having involved
herself in a sexual reationship with another person whose closeness
she cannot endure.
Nietzsche’s  disgust  reveals  unwittingly  the  implausibility  of  Kant’s
account, for Nietzsche says that simply being in the company of, one
must presume "ordinary", people will make him feel disgust for them.
Expressed in Kantian terms, it is as if he would constantly feel "too
much"  of  the  sweetness  of  attraction  and  be  unable  to  create  the
repulsion that comes with respect.  Consequently he feels disgust for
others.  In the extreme case we would have a situation where a person
who has a "really strong" feeling of attraction, "love" that is, could not
be among other people at all because she would immediately loose her
respect  for  them and feel  disgust  for  them.  I  will  here take it  for
granted that what such a reaction – by some psychologists referred to
with  the  term  "highly  sensitive  person"  –  reveals  is  a  case  of
repressing  love,  not  of  "loving  too  much"  –  which  is  a  senseless
notion.  You cannot repress your love only with regard to one specific
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person.  Repression is, so to speak, global: love as such is repressed.
This is what Nietzsche’s disgust at mankind is all about.
Nietzsche’s  reaction reveals  something that  Kant’s  seemingly  sober
analysis sweeps under the carpet: one cannot regulate one’s love by
aid of social  practices.   We can "only" repress love (and this is  of
course unconscious – though "subconscious" captures it better – in a
sense) but we are strongly  tempted to think that one can regulate it
along Kantian lines.  The both historically, socially and geographically
ubiquitous quest for respect (mafiosi and philosophy professors agree
here)  reveals  the  scope  of  that  temptation.   Nietzsche’s  heavy
emphasis on decency is closely related to "respect" and so he shares
with  Kant,  and  with  contemporary  ethical  views,  one  of  the  most
widespread,  severe  and  deep-seated  confusions,  namely  that  love
presupposes respect.  In contemporary versions respect has often come
to be seen even as part of the meaning of "love".  In fact, Nietzsche’s
longing for his friends, the free spirits, who also feel comfortable in
the cold solitude of the heights, is a quite easily recognisable longing
for respect.3 Nietzsche’s dream of a future superman is a dream of a
collectivity  that  would  be  able  to  redeem him from his  disgust;  a
dream of a notion of respect that  would  work, for the superman is
possible only in a "severe" and "militant" collectivity.  It is here that
we touch upon the  aspects  of  Nietzsche’s  thought  that  are,  despite
their apparent radicalness, quite common and highly appealing.   
We see how Nietzsche’s claim that it is in the cold heights of solitude
that he discovered the things "excommunicated by morality" (EH 4),
becomes doubtful to the same degree as his difficulties with closeness
turn  out  to  be  a  quite  familiar  case  of  ordinary  moral  problems  –
though cases like these are frequently not recognised as being moral.
Nietzsche is to some extent sensitive to what he is saying, when he
characterises his "sensitivity", for in the middle of his characterisation,
just when he has come to the closeness and the innermost parts of the
other, he as if exclaims – between dashes – "what am I saying?".  It is
as if he would have been struck by a sense of unreality and as if he
would exclaim in disbelief: "am I really saying this thing out loud?!"
3 Nietzsche is aware of his fantasy. In fact he says: "There are no such ’free spirits’, were none - but, as I said, I
needed their company [...]" Further, he hopes that "there could someday be such free spirits." (HH, 5)
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To speak about smell is without doubt one of the most embarrassing
things  there  are,  and to  speak about  it  in  the  "spiritual" sense  that
Nietzsche does, and in the way he does it, is even more embarrassing.
One might think, if one thinks along the lines of collective morality,
that Nietzsche’s claim about being so decent becomes questionable,
when one considers the embarrassment that he indulges in.  However,
given a certain repression, does not embarrassment go together with
love?  Embarrassment can be "absent" only if love would be absent –
if  that  is  thinkable.   Or then,  to  mention a  quite  different  but  still
related possibility: embarrassment is absent only to the extent love is
not repressed.
Nietzsche does have an ambivalent attitude to love.  On the one hand,
he says about Zarathustra that, due to his "superabundance of light and
power, through his nature as a sun, he is condemned not to love" (EH
78).  Still Zarathustra says that his soul too "is the song of a lover" and
that a "craving for love is  in me that  itself  speaks the language of
love" (EH 78, 80).  Why this craving if,  as Zarathustra says in the
chapter  on  neighbourly  love,  love  for  the  neighbour  should  be
abandoned in favour of friendship?  And why does Nietzsche allow
Zarathustra to speak about his "soul" here?  Because using this word is
connected to "love"?
Perhaps Kant’s take on love is lukewarm because he speaks about love
in  connection  to  friendship?   Is  it  something  like  Kant’s,  at  least
apparently, more sober attitude that Nietzsche envisions?  Kant seems
to think that the "rabble" do not understand the importance of more
balanced and distanced relationships – of friendship – and therefore
get  into  an  "excessive  familiarity"  tempted  by  the  "sweetness"  of
"fusing into one person".  They "fight and make up" without being
able either to be together or split (Kant 2000, 216).
For  Nietzsche,  the  relationship  to  the  "rabble"  seems  more
complicated.   He has to  struggle in  order  to  free  himself  from his
"greatest danger": disgust at the rabble (EH 18-19, 101).  Wondering
whether he has been understood, he says that his whole Zarathustra "is
a  dithyramb  on  solitude  or,  if  I  have  been  understood,  on
cleanliness..."(EH 18).  You can "wash away" the foul soul only by
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fleeing  into  the  isolation  of  subjectivity  –  that  true  friend  of
philosophers.
Why do the issues we have touched upon seem to be so tightly tied
together and yet so confusingly contradictory?  We have love and its
condemnation,  ridiculing  truth  and  the  big  Truth,  celebration  of
solitude and longing for friendship – and even for the rabble, disgust
at and attraction to the same "source", dirt of a kind where one must
fight for attaining cleanliness in an epochal fight, "soul" as a location
of  dirt  and as  the  core  of  love.   Why is  it  so  hard  to  specify the
harmfulness of Christianity and to criticise its notion of love, a notion
that Nietzsche, in order to make it seem dirtier, characterises as "lust
for one’s neighbour"?  And why is he as if choking up again with this
"what am I saying!" when he dismisses the Christian idea of  love as
the highest value (EH 102)?    
The Unavoidable
There are four things about love that I feel I must point out in order to
avoid certain confusions related to the issues at stake.  First, there is a
confusion  that  hampers  most  discourses  on  love,  namely  the
identification  of  love  with  romantic  falling  in  love.   However,  the
latter with its idealisation, along the lines of collective values, of the
beloved one, is in fact a repression of love – a repression where the
repressed is  acutely,  even if  subconsciously,  present.   Piling  up all
wonderful virtues that the beloved one is supposed to possess is in fact
a  typical  repression  in  that  it  involves  essentialising  away  the
openness of love.  The urgency of falling in love does have points of
contact with the urgency of Nietzsche’s predicament, the beloved one
taking  on  features  homologous  to  the  features  of  Nietzsche’s
superman.
Secondly,  love  is  not  something we chose  to  have  or  not  to  have.
What we can chose – if that is the word – is how far we dare to live
out love, which means: how far we dare to live.  Said in another way:
we can repress love in various ways and to various degrees, but not
erase it.  Love "is there" just as life is.  It is this "unavoidability" that
is  touched  upon  in  Nietzsche’s  statement  when  he  says  that  his
problem is enduring that he feels for and with others.
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Thirdly, love occurs between "You" and "I" – not between "us". "You"
and  "I"  does  not  denote  an  exclusive  relationship  between  two
persons.  It denotes the realm of understanding or, to put it less clearly
but  perhaps  more  accessibly,  the  grammar  of  fundamental  address.
This is what Nietzsche, like we all, have troubles with. "Meaning" is
not a question of logic. - Buber’s account of I-you uderstanding has,
despite the importance of its emphasising the difference beteen I-you
and I-it relationships, more problems than I can deal with here.  Most
importantly, since I think that religion is perhaps the most insidious
repression  of  I-you  understanding,  Buber’s  supernaturalising  claim
that god guarantees the meaning of I-you understanding amounts to
castrating this understanding.  One of the many consequences of this
castration  is  Buber’s  claim  that  guilt  is  some  kind  fundamental,
existential  predicament  (clearly  akin  to  "sin"),  probably  inspiring
Heidegger to adopt a similar view.  As to "love", I do not see how
Buber could  account for Nietzsche’s "unavoidable" love for people,
nor for the terrible disgust that he felt because of that love.  In general,
Buber ignores repression and mystifies I-you understanding and thus
goes against the very grain of that understanding: its openness.
Fourthly,  love  involves  openness  as  "engagement".  To  start  with
negative  descriptions,  openness  is  not  about  exposing  yourself  to
another, nor in general about being limitless.  It is, rather, about being
(in the sense of abiding) in love, in a way where "I" "dare" to get in
touch with myself  in that I dare to get in touch with "you".  This is
possible only in what can perhaps be captured by the Swedish (I am
not sure about the German) word  lust.  Lust  is not desire, for  lust  is
neither  a  lack  nor  something  that  can  be satisfied.  It  is  not  an
inclination, enjoyment, or drive but expresses something like a joy-
with-you.
Desire is subjective and imaginary (and so is its correlate "pleasure")
but to be in lust with the other is, precisely, not.  In desire you do not
care  about  the  other’s  openness,  and  so  you  can  imagine  that  she
desires you even when she does not.  Desire-pleasure is a repression of
lust.4  When you do not dare/want to be in the openness of lust  with
4 An important issue arises here, and I cannot help (well...) commenting shortly on it. In this repression two 
central, collective concepts arise: that of being man and that of being woman. Thus, to the extent that they act
as "man" and "woman", human beings cannot be open with each other either sexually, or in any other way. 
But then we never are simply and only man and woman. In the openness of lust – and to the extent we dare to
be in it – we "live out" our "being", but this being is not predetermined by collective ideas about gender, 
regardless whether the ideas in question are progressive or conservative. Another important thing to reflect at 
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the other you may still have desire for her.  You can force yourself on
the other out of desire but not out of lust.  Lust can, but need not, be
sexual.  Like life, it encompasses "more" than sexuality.
The traditional meanings of the words joy and lust do not say it, but I
understand this joy also as a joy of life.  Lust is not reciprocal.  It is
not "exchanged" but it can be repressed.  In repression one to a certain
extent and sense withdraws from being in the openness of lust and in
the  perspective  formed  in  this  repression,  the  "residues"  of  lust
emerge: desire, enjoyment, and drive.  The first is what is exchanged
in the relationless relation, the second what is savoured in the solitude
of subjectivity and the third is the meaningless urge to repeat eternally
this exchange.
In the openness of lust; in joy of life, you and me become living – as
much as we dare.  As long as you have life you have some lust, that is:
some openness, that is: some love.  This is life.  It becomes relevant to
say  that  this  is  unavoidably  so only  when we face  a  problem like
Nietzsche’s.   Newborns  literally  die  if  left  without  contact  to  any
"you".  -  The  repression  of  lust  that  occurs  in  desire-pleasure  is
revealed with particular clarity in psychosis which without doubt is an
indulgement in desire-pleasure and hence precisely not about being in
lust with the other.         
These  four points  will,  I  hope,  avert  some  of  the  most  obvious
misunderstandings of what I mean.  They also indicate why so many
discourses on love, and sexuality, are confused.  This also concerns
psychoanalysis which, in the words of Mladen Dolar, is prepared to
think of love as an "artificially produced", "highly pathological state"
or "mechanism" that exhibits its "purest form" in the analytic situation
(Dolar p.  84).   Moreover,  when Lacan says "love is,  essentially,  to
wish to be loved" (Lacan 1998, 253), he goes totally astray.  This can
be seen already from the fact that if he would be right, no one would
care a bit about love.  An analogy might be clarifying here: someone
who lacks sexual desire, as far as that is conceivable, does not care a
bit about being sexually desired.  Nor does she even know what it is to
be sexually desired.  There is no such thing as a mere wish to be loved.
is how we should understand our problems with the "unavoidable". One of our deepest temptations is to place
the unavoidability outside ourselves on external circumstances, for instance on our "destiny" of being born as
men and women. In this repression we alienate ourselves from openness without wanting to see that what we 
cannot erase – Nietzsche’s problem – is our "joy-of-life" with the other. 
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The wish to be loved becomes intensified: intensely repressed, to the
same extent that one does not endure one’s own preparedness to love.
-  Love  as  a  joy-of-life,  with  the  sexuality  that  goes  with  it,  is
something  that  no  psychoanalyst  will, qua  psychoanalyst, ever
encounter.
Allow me also to comment shortly on two important accounts on love,
those of Kierkegaard and Scheler,  for they share the same problem.
Kierkegaard’s account of love  has the problem that, like other forms
of  repression,  it   "rescues"  us  from  the  "hardships"  of  love  by
introducing the function of a third person (more on that below).  Only,
it is a god who fulfils this function in Kierkegaard.  (See Kierkegaard
2009, 314-15.)  Scheler’s account is hampered by the same problem –
apart  from the general  problem with his  value-theory.  (See Scheler
2017, 230.)
The Greatest Danger
Let me begin discussing  Nietzsche’s problems with love  by stating
that I do not think that Christianity has much anything to do with love.
It  simply  uses  the  term  in  a  demagogic  way  just  as  capitalist
demagogues  use  "free  market"  and  communist  demagogues  use
"democracy".  Christianity does not have any – and could not endure
any – developed idea of love.  It only needs to repeat endlessly the
word love in order to make shame and guilt surface.  Christianity’s
conception of love is about as developed, as the one you can find in an
airport-novel:  a  simple  combination  of  an  ordinary  notion  of
moderation  and  a  dialectic  between  altruism and  egoism.5 Love  is
taken to be "that" which "endures all things" as St. Paul says.
Why does shame and guilt surface when love is spoken about?  Why
is it embarrassing to use the word love – and perhaps particularly in a
philosophical context?  Why is it as if all intellectual rigour would go
down the drain as soon as love is discussed – except if it is discussed
in  a  cynical  way?   This  impression of  the  "stupidity"  of  love  is,
contrary  to  what  Lacan  thinks  (and  here  most  philosophers  would
support him, see Lacan 1999, pp. 11 ff.), not on the side of love but on
5 This is so even in the more elaborate forms of it. Kierkegaard (2009, 339): "True love is self-renunciation’s 
love."
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the side of philosophy’s inability to deal with it.  In question is in fact
philosophy’s essential, sophisticated stupidity.
Why is it that people in general, just as the most educated specialists
in  psychology  and  philosophy,  have  equally  huge  confusions
concerning love – for instance that  love is  blind?  Or that  it  is  an
emotion,  drive,  instinct,  spirituality,  infatuation,  reciprocal  desire,
deceptive narcissism, innate disposition...?
Nietzsche is in the grips of a problematic, the character of which he
did not seem to fathom.  Is love then not unfathomable?  Here I want
to  pose  a  counter-question:  who  is  it,  and  with  an  eye  to  what
philosophical  elaboration,  that  feels  herself  capable  of  making  this
judgment?  How is one obvious problem to be avoided: that it is only
the  speaker  who  cannot  deal  with  love  and  who,  smelling  this
intolerable  fact,  projects  it  onto  love  itself?   Such  a  projection
becomes  even  more  pernicious  when  it  acquires  "intellectual
authority" from a community  of  researchers  or therapists  who take
themselves to have detected  one or two "essential features" of love
and who thus think they have escaped "naïve" ideas about love.  In
fact, taking love to be something unfathomable, is a quite comforting
idea – equally comforting as taking it to be narcissism.  The question
here arises whether not one’s smelling that one finds it hard to deal
with,  to  endure,  love  is  the  most  intolerable  "fact"  that  there  is?
Philosophy  is  replete  with  accounts  where  the  openness  of  love  is
essentialised  away.   Philosophy  is  that  essentialisation  –  love  is
openness (but not "by contrast").  This is why love lies "at the very
heart  of philosophical  discourse",  to  transplant  a  phrase of Lacan’s
(1999, 39).  
Why is the disgust at the rabble the "greatest danger" to Nietzsche?
This does not become quite clear from the passages we have discussed
so far, so let us look at another passage where this greatest danger is
also  touched  upon.   The  passage  is  from the  same  chapter  where
Nietzsche  expresses  his  disgust  at  "failed  souls"  but  here  he  has
moved on to lament on the "levelling of European man":
Right here is where the  destiny of Europe  lies – in losing
our  fear  of  man  we  have  also  lost  our  love  for  him,  our
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respect for him, our hope in him and even our will to be man
(GM 25).
It  would now seem that  disgust at the rabble is  a danger in that it
arises because Nietzsche gets himself too close to the rabble.  How
does this happen?  When European man has been levelled, mediocre
and indifferent, Nietzsche says that he loses his love for man.  When
Nietzsche says he loses his love for the rabble, it comes  closer,  too
close, to him and Nietzsche does not – may Kant help him! - find
enough respect to push away the rabble.  Disgust is the result.  But is
it not paradoxical to say that when the rabble comes too close, one
looses one’s love for man?  Well, yes and no.
What Kant did not see is that if respect is lost, also the "love" he is
talking about is lost. It is not that there is more, not to say "too much",
of it. If one thinks of love as something mutual this is not surprising at
all. But if one thinks that it sounds curious to say that when respect is
lost one also ceases to love, it is because one has a hunch that love is
not reciprocity.    
One could say that it is the universal problem of man, that man longs
for a love where the distance to the other is appropriate according to
her own tastes.  If the other comes "too close”, this will destroy love –
from the perspective  of  the person who feels like  this.   But in this
perspective it is of course never conceived of as being about the other
coming too close, but about the other lacking  in respect.  From the
second  person’s  perspective  –  and,  to  be  a  bit  obscure:  from  the
second  person  perspective  –  however,  the  first  mentioned  person’s
love is felt to be distant and lukewarm.  It is only the first mentioned
perspective that is subjective, not the second.  (Openness is neither a
subjective nor an objective point of view: it is not a "point of view".)
Kant, perhaps blinded by an upper-class narcissism, thought that there
existed a consensus concerning the proper distance.  Or perhaps it was
just wishful thinking?  May be it is wishful thinking that Nietzsche is
up to, too?  What is the wish about?
Nietzsche  cannot  stand the closeness  of  a  "failed  soul"  alone.   He
needs the free spirits, or at least the thought of them: spirits that like to
dwell  up  in  the  heights  amongst  snow and ice.   Apart  from these
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heights, love for the European man would be possible only if there
would still be  something to fear in the European man.  Why would
fear have this effect?  Well, if one fears a person one very obviously
stands at a certain distance from that person.  Fear too, is a principle of
repulsion, to gesture towards Kant’s dynamics here.
Nietzsche repeatedly spoke for cruelty and violence.  The notion of a
heroic warrior was important to him.  To be a warrior in the classical
sense  means  that  neither  blood,  faces,  urine,  saliva  nor  any  other
bodily exudations disturb you.  A warrior will not only be close to the
entrails of other men; he cannot avoid to be splattered by all kinds of
bodily fluids.  However, this side of the warrior’s life never seems to
worry Nietzsche.  Nor does it worry the warrior.  Metaphorical dirt
and smell are more unendurable than their concrete counterparts.
At this moment, it might be important to observe that even the so-
called metaphorical smell will  decrease in an hostile  atmosphere (so
much for "metaphor"!).  When you are raging at someone, you can
throw out all sorts of truly intimate and personal issues.  Cruelty and
irony create a distance where you can without – almost without – any
qualms harshly criticize a person by referring to intimate issues.  And
you have no troubles placing your growling face just one inch from
the  other’s  face  –  something  you  perhaps  would never  have  done
otherwise with this person.  In Swedish we have the expression ‘läsa
lusen av’ (to read the louses off someone) for such criticism.
The  louse  is  a  symbol  for  dirtiness  and  smell.   In  rage,  you  can
without  visible  problems  (safe for the rage of course), attend to the
other  person’s  metaphorical  entrails.   And  is  not  Nietzsche’s
philosophy in many ways a discourse of such a rage?  When you take
enough distance in one regard,  you can allow yourself to attend to
intimate details in another.
Another depiction of the disgust we are talking about can be found in
Sartre’s Nausea.  Here we encounter a discussion on love for mankind
and this makes the situation difficult.  This discussion makes the main-
character, Antoine Roquentin, react in the following way to the words
of the Self-Taught man:  
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I can't speak any more, I bow my head. The Self-Taught
Man's face is close to mine. He smiles foolishly, all the while
close to my face, like a nightmare. With difficulty I chew a
piece of bread which I can't make up my mind to swallow.
People. You must love people. Men are admirable. I want to
vomit - and suddenly, there it is: the Nausea (Sartre, 62).
Distance dilutes the disgust.  But metaphorical smell is something you
can feel only when there is a closeness that is alarming.  Nietzsche’s
problem is  the  disgust:  the  lack  of  distance,  his  inability  to  keep
distance.  Has Nietzsche been led to his obscenely explicit judgments
on “failed souls” by being unable to resist that he does "feel for and
with"  these  souls?   What  a  strange problem – or  is  it?   He needs
aggression in order to, try to, keep these "failed" souls at bay, and he
envisions a superman who would not care a bit for others, who would
have overcome this "feeling for" - a feeling which Nietzsche despises
– in himself too.
As to the sigh I have been discussing: Nietzsche seems to transform
this sigh, before it even becomes one, from being a recognition of his
difficulty with perceiving a fellow human being into becoming a hope
for a kind of human being that, being frightening, would permanently
"cure" Nietzsche from his "fate": his unavoidable caring for the other.
He seems to be longing for a human being who, in being frightening,
would not come close and whom it therefore would be easier not to
care  for  in  a "disturbing"  way.  He longs  for  “love”  in  its  normal,
collective sense, sung about by pop singers.  
Is it this curiously incurable caring that Nietzsche has in mind when
he calls himself a decadent?   He does not see that he has repressed
openness and distorted it  into  a  disturbing limitlessness,  and so he
perhaps thinks that he is too human, that he is not yet the man of the
future, the superman: because he cares.  "It is only among decadents
that pity is called a virtue. [...] I count the overcoming of pity amongst
the noble virtues" (EH 13).  (It should be obvious how much wishful
thinking is loaded into the word noble.)
Nietzsche  thinks  that  "giving  in"  for  love  and  pity  is  a  sign  of
weakness against stimuli and a lack of strength and will power.  He
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says that a "life that lies in love free from all [...] keeping of distances"
is  a  consequence of a "morbid sensibility of the tactile nerves" (AC
46-47).  This way of thinking is old in philosophy and it is repeated in
another key by Freud and psychoanalysis.  Love is taken to be a soft
emotionality or an urge of narcissism, of nature, of  das Es, etc., and
only hedonists and weaklings (psychotics and perverts) give in to it
and only neurotics let themselves be troubled by it.  The "normally
unhappy" person – that is: the "healthily" lukewarm person, in short:
the Kantian – will not,  normally, take that much trouble with these
"urges", which both Kant and psychoanalysts regard as "pathological".
Psychoanalysts  celebrate  the  Kantian  moral  law  which  rests  on
achtung, because it provides a possibility to play out love against the
law in a basically similar way as Kant himself does.  
Nietzsche, together with the tradition that he takes himself to re-value,
shares this deep confusion  concerning love; a  confusion that  is  the
other  side  of  his  suffering,  disgust,  melancholy  and  aggression.
Nietzsche had difficulties with being normally unhappy, and I doubt
that any therapy would have helped him.
The Friend
At  this  stage  it  becomes  relevant  to  bring  in  Nietsche’s  imagined
friend, the free  spirit, that Nietzsche longs for when he says that he
cannot stand the smell of a failed soul alone.  With a view to what has
emerged so far, it seems that this friend is rather important in that she
at least  in some sense ameliorates Nietzsche’s disgust.   Apart  from
closeness  to  a  failed  soul,  Nietzsche  can,  as  he  said  in  the  above
quotation from GM, deal perfectly  well  with solitude,  but with the
failed soul, he needs a friend.  The notion of the superman who has
managed  to  get  rid  of  pity  and  conscience  does  not  seem to  help
Nietzsche here.
It is in some sense self-evident that a friend can comfort you in many
ways, but perhaps the self-evidence of this self-evidence is not, after
all, that self-evident?  Anyway, Nietzsche’s friends are supposed to be
at home amongst snow and ice.  Is this a crude, inhuman dream where
Nietzsche fantasizes about friends that are actually projections of his
own difficulties with human intimacy?  I suppose it is tempting to say
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"yes".  And I say "tempting" because  it does not seem to me to be
particularly inhuman to think like Nietzsche.
Is  it  perhaps  not  common  among  us  men  that  we  fantasize  about
friends and spouses that would be our dream come true; a dream-wife
or dream-husband – and even dream-children?  Secondly, it might not
be all that uncommon if this dream-friend would be imagined to have
exactly the same sense of intimacy and openness as we, the dreamers,
have.  "Of course" it is also important that this partner challenges us
but  it  is,  paradoxically,  equally  natural  that  the  challenge  must  lie
within the limits of what we take to be "appropriate" challenge.  So, in
the  end,  we  tend  to  dream  about  a  duplication  of  ourselves,  a
duplication that,  as if  by magic, still  would not be us.   Nietzsche’s
dream seems all too human.
But, trying to locate the source of our dreams, a friend could cause us
no small difficulties.  The closer the friend is allowed to approach, the
bigger the potential problems – as Kant saw.  Though he thought that
it is the loss of respect that poses the unavoidable problem. Love must
be restricted.  What a curious logic!  As if love would be some kind of
excess, like eating too much. (And does not Lacan’s view come down
to this too?)
What  Kant  feared  was  the  loss  of  respect.  For  "once  respect  is
violated, its presence within is irretrievably lost" (Kant 200, 215).  Is
this what had happenend to Nietzsche?  He could neither keep people
at bay nor understand them in the light of love.  Hence his disgust.  He
is like the jealous spouse who completely "humiliates" herself because
she can neither love the other nor give him up.  
When we have hard problems with a friend there arises, as a response
to the problems, an idea of still another friend.  This other, unknown –
and unknowable! - friend appears in our dreams as an escape from the
problems with the actual friend.  It appears to be the essence of this
unknown friend that forms our concept of friendship. The fact that an
actual friend can perform the function of this unknwon friend does not
change anything.
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Is friendship a dream?  Something imaginary?  Like dreams, this idea
of a friend can disperse and so, in the depression  that follows, it is
tempting to say, as the wise man does: "Friends, there are no friends".
But  as  we  shall  see,  the concept  of  friend  is  in  fact  a  collective,
repressive function. 
The dream-friend  is  distinctly  perceptible  in  Levinas’s  idea  of  the
other.6  The other and I are according to Levinas asymmetrical in that I
owe the other an "excessive generosity".  This absolute demand of the
other is a heavy burden but, Levinas says, then justice comes with the
third  person,  with  sociality,  "human plurality" (Levinas 1999,  101-
102).  Levinas thinks that the I-you relationship is an asymmetrically
reciprocal relationship.  "I" just owe the other an excessive generosity.
But when sociality – in the form of the third person – arrives,  this
excess is "subordinated to a question of justice".7  What a relief!  No
wonder that Levinas says "Sociality, for me, is the best of the human.
It  is  the  good,  and  not  the  second  best  to  an  impossible  fusion"
(Levinas 1999, 103).  One sees how "good" in its proclaimed moral
sense is impossible to distinguish from subjective enjoyment – and
enjoyment can only be subjective.  For it is only to the subject; an
entity isolated from both you and her "I", that sociality constitutes this
"blessing".
It is easy to see that Levinas’s notion of  excessive generosity  is an
euphemism for the painful and disgusting unavoidability of openness
and  lust.   It  is  equally easy to see how his notion of sociality  and
justice fills the same function as Nietzsche’s free spirits. 
6 I will discuss Levinas not because he would emphasise collectivity more than others but because he, 
inadvertently, emphasises those features that I think are central for the repression that occurs in collectivity. 
In short: I think that Levinas’s account is more profound than most others; it reveals the, as it were, 
fundamental repression. - In this connection I also want to remind the reader of the above references to 
Kierkegaard and Scheler.  
7 Here I just want to announce that a discussion concerning formality would be in place, for one of the forces 
that create the distance between "I" and "you" is formalisation: the idea that what is morally right and wrong 
is not a question about my openness with you but a question of formal correctness; of the formal-conceptual 
correspondence between action and moral essence, which too, is a formal construction. "Moral essence" is of 
course a polymorphous brew of various collective values that compete with each other as to what is the most 
relevant repression of love. Apart from that, the fear that is internal to subjecting oneself to moral law is in 
fact an aspect of the "repulsive" power of respect. Respect for the moral law, and for the other, also contains 
the rational agent’s respect for formal reasoning, the kind of reasoning that is, in a rational and law-like 
manner, supposed to settle moral problems. This formal, law-like discourse would seem to allow the moral 
agent to dwell in her own subjectivity. What Heidegger says about respect is not all wrong: “Respect is the 
mode of the ego’s being-with-itself.” (Heidegger 1988, 135) But then there is Nietzsche’s case. - All in all 
one can say that respect is the rational equilibrium of loneliness. 
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With Levinas we meet again the idea of the fusion into one person.
Where does this idea come from?  From the beginning of time?  I
cannot discuss the idea of fusion here, but let me just note that this
idea suffers from a serious confusion that is usually, perhaps since the
beginning of time, completely overlooked: that, to the extent it makes
sense at all to speak of such a fusion, this fusion would, to that same
extent, make the other quite harmless; to a duplication of yourself, or
of  your  illusions.   It  makes  no  sense  to  speak  of  an  excessive
generosity towards – nor of an overwhelming disgust for – an other
that vanishes in fusion (though it is another aspect of the issue, that if
we would get  a  friend that  would appear  to us as a duplication of
ourselves, we would soon start to despise her).8
But there is the smell.  This smell could not possibly originate from an
other with whom one would have vanished in sweet fusion.  The smell
shows without doubt that someone is there; someone who is not I.  I
have called it a you.  The "problem" with "you" is that you bring me to
my I; to be a human being who, in daring to be an I, dares to be open
to another human being.  The you is not I but still it is not a  not-I
either.   The  you  is  neither  same  nor  other;  neither  identical  nor
different;  neither  familiar  nor  alien.   This  neither  nor,  which  is
unintelligible  to  both  ordinary  and  philosophical  thinking,  shines
through  in  our  problems  with openness.   For  it  is  not  possible  to
determine whether the smell, the smell of fear of openness, originates
from "me" or "you".  And does not Nietzsche’s extensive washing and
bathing reveal, that he is not too sure?
Or perhaps the smell originates from both?  But if both would smell,
and be aware of this fact, there would be no problem – like between
two persons who have both eaten garlic.  But Nietzsche tries hard to
make it appear as if  it would be precisely the  other who smells.  He
8 There is such a thing as fusion of persons but it is a collective phenomenon, the grim aspects of which are well 
captured in the following passage where Jonathan Haidt quotes a veteran – only, Haidt thinks this fusion is the 
foundation of morality; he does not see either the grimness or the religious-phantasmagoric undertones of it:
Many veterans who are honest with themselves will admit, I believe, that the experience of
communal effort in battle [...] has been the high point of their lives [...] Their “I” passes insensibly
into a “we,” “my” becomes “our,” and individual fate loses its central importance  [...] I believe
that it is nothing less than the assurance of immortality that makes self sacrifice at these moments
so relatively easy [...] I may fall, but I do not die, for that which is real in me goes forward and
lives on in the comrades for whom I gave up my life (Haidt 2012, 240).
24
does not seem to take his obsession with cleanliness as an indication
that  he  might  have  a  subconscious  fear  that  it  is  he  himself  who
smells.   Anyway,  the  smell  arises  in  the  isolation  created  by
repression.  The smell also indicates that the isolation has not been
completely successful (and it  can never be): the other is still  there.
Naturally,  this  smell  is  now,  as  far  as  possible,  projected  on  that
"repulsive" other while, at the same time, the fear is that it issues from
oneself.   The  smell  is  the  unlocalisable,  unerasable residue  of
repression; it is a synesthetic sensation of the self-disgust that goes
with the alienation that I have created between me and you.   
Nietzsche’s statement is in a certain sense right: it is the closeness of
another soul that smells – and we all know the disturbing meaning of
this.   But  now,  what  is  the  relationship  between  this  horrible
Nietschean smell and Levinas’s excessive and unsettling generosity?
One could say that  this Nietzschean smell  will  remain even if  you
manage  to  escape,  with  the  help  of  justice, from the  demand  that
seems to underlie the Levinasian generosity.  Also, there is a curious
common  "feature"  in  both  notions,  something  that  is  perhaps  not
exactly excessive, not declared to be rotten, not perceived as a danger
but something from which one is "saved" – not without residue – with
the help of a third person: the you.
It is the third person, correctly identified with sociality by Levinas,
who saves one, as far as this is possible, from the you.  In Nietzsche’s
case one would have to add: the society of free spirits – or perhaps a
society of fearful warriors.  How can society have this extraordinary
effect?  Well, has it not become obvious?  Because it creates distance.
Collectivity  is  our  commonly  created  distance-nerarness  or  love-
respect dynamics.  It is closeness, the repressed analogue to openness,
that smells.  Not any closeness of course, but the closeness that takes
you closer to me than I can endure.  In fact, "justice" with the sociality
that  goes with it  does have something of  the fearfulness  Nietzsche
longs for, for it is backed up by a power that does create distance –
"fresh air" – in society.
Society does not "save" us by specifying the proper distance but by
infusing distance into love.  This is done by establishing "moral law",
a  law  that  is  upheld  by  the  value  of  respect:  by  the  principle  of
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repulsion that restricts the smelly "attraction" of love.  One could call
this the cultural castration of love.9
"Castration"?   Well,  I  think  that  the  openness  of  love  that  is  here
constrained, is an aspect of life.  To say "no" to it is to say no to life.
That is what Nietzsche is doing.  I think it is misleading to call this




It is not only justice that comes with the third person.  With the third
person also arrive other aspects of the third person perspective: norms,
values, duties, traditions, practices, rites and  (collective) morality in
general.  As we have seen, these things do not come as it were from
the outside.  They come  as the outside of the terrified human being
who in repression creates for herself an inside that she hopes can be
isolated from the frightening you, who is banished as the outside, as
“sociality”.   This  illusory  inside,  subjectivity,  needs  an  outside
recognition, and that recognition consists in the collective, objective,
morality,  whose  object-like  objectivity  is  equally  illusory  and  can
never be established but whose repressive pressure is objective in the
sense  of:  appearing to  come  from  the  outside.  Here  a  critical
discussion of Hegel’s conception of conscience and recognition would
be illuminating,10 but  what  Nietzsche  says  in  GS §117 reveals  the
basic dynamics.
Nietzsche thinks that in remote times conscience was different; that
people abhored free will and personal responsivbility.  What in those
days  gave  pangs  of  conscience  was  if  something  hurt  the  herd.
Nietzsche overlooks the fact that this tension between the individuality
and collectivity  is  an  essential  characteristic  of  the  the  problem at
9 Probably not seeing the excess that disturbs Levinas, Raimond Gaita gives this respect an thoroughly 
excessive, "absolute", meaning. Here is how he responds to Kant’s statement that "everything empirical" is 
injurious to morality: "That he [Kant] had a point can be seen by reflecting that it seems that no amount of 
lyrical improvisation on the love of our neighbour or on a sense of human fellowship, on our common 
mortality or on compassion, etc., will take us to the idea of unconditional respect for all persons, for reasons 
which are obvious and which Kant pointed out." (Gaita 2004, 41.) So love is something empirical! And is not
the other side of "lyrical improvisation" on love precisely the seriousness, a word endlessly repeated by 
Gaita, of unconditional respect? Is it not by adopting this respect that love is, in secret awe, first 
sentimentalised, then kept at distance and finally ridiculed?
10 A discussion of Lacan’s empathetic account of Freud’s horror of love for one’s neighbour as well as Lacan’s 
view of the connection between "you" and the "Thing" would also be in place here (See Lacan 1997). For 
more on this, see Nykänen 2019.
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hand;  of  the  "metaphysics  of  ethics".  What  Nietzsche  says  is
inadequate in the same way as it would be to say of some older society
that it is completely different than ours because they were so occupied
with honour while we are occupied with shame. 
The repression of I-you understanding creates the "inner", the "outer",
and collective morality, and, being a repression of love, a disgust at
love, it has a violent character.  The essential aspect of this violence is
power.  Power is "repulsion" in that it creates an effect that side-steps
openness and pressures people to act according to its demand.  Power
is an anonymous, distancing closedness in that it involves pressuring
(forcing,  threatening,  frightening, seducing,  flattering,  persuading,
buying,  etc.)  people  to  something,  ignoring  what  they  themselves
think.   When is  one further  from the other  than when one tries  to
silence the other’s own thought and to replace it with one’s own?  And
how own are one’s thoughts here?  How far am I not from being an "I"
when I try, using whatever ways that I think might work, to make the
other succumb to my will; a will driven by subjective interests?  How
obvious it is that the words I utter are not my words but words who
are calculated to have a certain effect.
Creating distance and non-understanding is the very point of collective
morality (but all the things that follow suite – such as loneliness - are
not  equally  desired).   Why  not  ignore  morality  –  which  is  what
Nietzsche  expects  the  superman  to  do?   Well,  that  simply  is
unthinkable: what would it even mean?  No wonder Nietzsche cannot
give  us  any  idea  about  it.   He  himself  felt  the  drive  towards
collectivity; to his friends, the free spirits and "hyperboreans".
If collective morality would not be underpinned by power, it would
become meaningless.  What is a norm if there is no pressure to heed
it?  What is a duty that is never enforced?  What is a right that one is
not  obliged to  acknowledge?  What  is  respect  that  cannot  be
demanded?  Someone might here say that it is superficial to think that
one acts morally because one has to, for "genuine" moral acting starts
from a necessity that one acknowledges oneself.  The felt necessity is
self-imposed.  This would be a stupid objection firstly, because what I
am trying to bring out is how we, in fear of a certain disgust, tend to
desire to subject ourselves to power and, secondly, because the power-
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ridden grammar of morality does not change at all even if it would be
the subject herself who subjects herself to power.  Masochism is all
violence even if it is the subject herself who agrees to it it.  A subject
is a subjected-subjecting, repressed “I”.  In fact, the morally relevant
aspect of power, in contrast to its actual consequences, exists only to
the extent that it is acknowledged by those subjected to it.  
Both  Nietzsche’s disgust  and  his rejection of "slave morality" have
their  source  in  his  sense  of  life.   Despite  his  not  very successful
struggle  with  the  openness  of  love,  Nietzsche  does  perceive  the
strangling character of ordinary morality, its, as he says, immorality.
He  also  perceives  the  suffocating  sentimentality  and  greasiness  of
ordinary,  romantic  ideas  of  love.   But  then  he  commits  the
philosophical blunder par excellence: he goes, and quite delibaretly11,
in the direction of the on the contrary.  He wants to abolish morality
and love in order to open for new possibilities.  It does not strike him
that philosophical oppositions are creations of the (Western, Greek-
Christian)  thinking  that  he  wants  to  re-value.   Thus,  he  fails  to
perceive  what his sense of life,  his love, could have revealed to him
and, instead, interprets it in the terms of the repressing and distorting
understanding of "love" and "morality" current in his times – and is
sickened.  Instead of questioneing it, Nietzsche accepted the collective
understanding of love and morality and then concluded that love and
morality as such are to be overcome (and, given the premises, who can
blame him for the conclusion?).  To be immerged in collectivity is not
an  abstract  matter  but  involves  understanding-perceiving  things
according to its concepts: its values and norms.12 It is in fact difficult
not to do so  even if one would in one’s thought be critical of those
values and norms. ("Don’t worry, it’s nothing to be ashamed of!" -
"Yes, I know, but I still...") 
One could say that Nietzsche, unwittingly using and developing the
weapons of  collectivity,  attacks love and openness with the energy
provided by his sense of life.  He radicalises the collective distortion
of love, openness and conscience.  He amplifies the violent power that
is immanent in the collective concepts.  But he confuses the concept of
"herd  mentality"  –  collectivity  -  with  the  specific,  Christian  herd
11 "I contradict as has never been contradicted […]" (EH 96)
12 Are not collective values and norms highly varying? From my point of view they are just different ways of 
subjectifying-objectifying I-you understanding, and Nietzsche’s predicament reveals some of the very general
features of this repression-distortion.
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mentality  that  he criticises.   He does not  seem to notice that  "free
spirits"  as  well  as  the  aristocrazy  are  as  much  instances  of  herd
mentality as Christianity.  The brave young aristocratic man who will
without hesitation draw his sward – and it is this kind of gesture that
Nietzsche  so  admires  –  to  defend  his  honour,  will  as  an  obedient
school boy marry the woman that daddy and mam have chosen for
him – all according to what "one simply does", given the values of
one’s herd.
Nietzsche’s  philosophy  is  a  destillate  of  the  general,  philosophical
confusion concerning individuality and collectivity.  He sees that in
collectivity people can act in ways so ruthless, that as individuals they
could not dream of acting that way.  But his explanation of how this is
possible addresses only the superficial side of the issue: 
How does it happen that the state will do a host of things
that  the  individual  would  never  countenance?  -  Through
division  of  responsibility,  of  command,  and  of  execution.
Through the  interposition of the virtues of obedience, duty,
patriotism,  and  loyalty.  Through  upholding  pride,  severity,
strength, hatred, revenge - in short, all typical characteristics
that contradict the herd type (WP §717).
"Contradict the herd type"! What a misconception! This  is  the very
realm of the herd.  And as the veteran I cited above notes, when the
herd-mentality is thick enough, you do not even need to be courageous
because all there is, is the herd.  But true, what "the state organises"
here is  will to power  and when it is far gone, particular persons and
their thoughts do not count at all.  What a relief from disgust!
The herd-state is a sum of different euphorias, including sexual ones.
The unbelievably maddening effects of collectivity can be clearly seen
in the documentary on Charles Manson’s "family" ("Manson The Lost
Tapes").  Here the woman who killed Sharon Tate said that stabbing
someone to death is a sexual release more powerful than an orgasm
"because" everything in life is intercourse: is  about "in and out".  In
the "sexiness of power", the strong feeling of lust has been repressed-
distorted into  desire, and desire involves  power.  One  intensely (and
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lust  cannot be intense) wants something of the other at the  biggest
possible  distance from  her.  -  Why  has  this  kind  of  outrageous
madness no diagnose?  A madness where persons say that they are
completely one, completely fusioned, with their leader?  Is it not here
that we see the Kantian-Levinasian "sweetness" of fusion?  And are
we lacking a diagnose because what we are seeing is a quite "normal"
collective behaviour, only: in this particular case it does not have the
usual kind of collective legitimation? 
Nietzsche’s thought reflects his ambiguity; his need for and hatred of
the herd.  Out of this hatred he does see the "immorality of morality"
and the way "[m]oral values reveal themselves to be conditions of the
existence of society" (WP §§271-72) but in his efforts to escape his
disgust, in his need of friends, he goes completely astray, and assumes
that the "shepherds" of the herd, the free spirits, lying at the top of his
order  of  rank,  could  withdraw themselves  from  herd-thinking  (WP
§287). 
When this repressing-distorting, collective construction of a violence-
based  morality  is  taken  as  morality  as  such,  its  violent  pressure,
collective pressure, is correspondingly, by Nietzsche and most others
including Freud and Lacan,  taken to  be  "conscience".13  What  has
been repressed is an experience where you feel that you violate your
love for the other.  Repression cannot do away with this feeling.  Thus
we distort  it,  using our conceptual  powers.   The terrible feeling of
violating another human being is interpreted as a guilt-ridden, violent
power that forbids and punishes. But it also creates distance.  Instead
of reflecting at what I am about to do to you, I and my action become
objects of moral assessment – and in a sense this is precisely what I
"wanted".   This violent, judging power, which I have called collective
pressure, has almost universally been heard, as if psychotically, as the
voice  of  the  good,  or  even  "god".14 And when  the  herd  allows  it,
violating this morality produces its own euphoria.
13 Nietzsche does see, that what he takes to be conscience: collective pressure, is "the invention of […] the
man of ressentiment" (GM 49) but he does not see that, in this case too, there is a "sentiment" to which the    
resentiment is a reaction. If this were not a standard case of repression, one might think it odd that, unlike the
case with master and slave morality, Nietzsche here "forgets" the "instance" to which collective pressure is a 
response to, namely conscience. The "masters" do not have anything that collective pressure could be a 
response to, for they just have their own collective pressure, based on aristocratic values.     
14 May be I should, just in case, point out that what I say does not imply that I think that collective morality 
should be abolished – whatever that would mean. I just want to situate a possible meaning of love with 
respect to the idea of moral law (collective morality). And there may be some points of contact between what 
I say about love’s openness and what Lacan says about, what he calls, "limitless" love, though the concept 
limitless does not capture at all what I mean by openness. (See Lacan 1998, 276.)
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Nietzsche, just like Freud, Lacan, Heidegger, Kant and most others,
took  collective  pressure  for  conscience.   Was  it  his  disgust  that
prevented him from experiencing  his  conscience?   Did conscience,
this  alarm bell  of  openness  and  lust,  bring  him "too  close"  to  the
other?  Whatever the case, he wanted to get rid of conscience.  But
what does he mean by that?  For what he understands by conscience is
without  doubt  what  I  have  called  collective  pressure?   Nietzsche’s
predicament seems to be that he tried to get rid of both conscience and
collective pressure.   This may have led him to affirm "power" as the
highest principle of life and to proclaim the superman as its prophet.
But power is, precisely, the founding principle of the herd.  And trying
to get rid of both conscience and collective pressure: of both the fear
of what is repressed and of the oppressive side of repression, lies at
the root of all herd-values. 
Nietzsche did not see in what sense the instance that he thought was
the biggest disaster in our culture, the church, was built upon power.
His wondering about how the "weak", the slaves of slave morality,
could  win  the  "strong"  ones,  the  masters  of  the  master  morality,
reveals  his  nearsightedness  here.   Another  thing  that  shows
Nietzsche’s nearsightedness is that he did not see how his response to
every human soul was a typical case of what he himself termed as
ressentiment  – a  herd-reaction.  It  is  from  this  reaction  that  herd-
morality is formed.
Power is essentially desire: to want something from the other without
wanting-daring to be in the openness of  lust  with her.  Power is to
exert influence on the other: it is to want to act as a remote control of
the other.  The other side of power, equally present in Nietzsche, is the
drive  to  succumb to such forcing influence, that is: the urge to think
that such influence is forcing.  Such forcing may need the use of the
sword but as we all know, there are many other ways too, such as the
kind  of  threatening,  shaming,  guilt-mongering  and  bullying  that
Christianity has been up to with its "love" preaching.  In fact, we like
to think of ourselves as automatically subjected to such forces, such as
when  we  explain  our  questionable  behaviour  by  saying:  "Well,  if
someone..., then one cannot help that one..."
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If the main task is to get rid of conscience, as Nietzsche thought, then
Christianity  has  made  a  very  good  job  with its  contribution  to
substituting collective pressure for conscience.  But it is possible to
get rid of one’s conscience "only" to the same extent that it is possible
to  get  rid  of  one’s  humanity.   One  cannot  get  rid of  conscience
because one cannot get rid of love – and a particularly ridiculous and
pathetic effort to do so, is  the intellectual  person’s attempt to view
love from some kind of superior position. 
The will to power is a violent will to distance oneself from joy of life:
the  joy-with-the-other,  "I"  being  in  openness  with  "you",  and  it
"needs" to be violent because one also longs for this joy.  One "has to"
tear oneself away from  lust  by way of a destructive force.  "Will to
power" thus  constitutes a thorough "no" to life.   However,  being a
repression, what is repressed, joy of life, love, is never simply absent.
The  more  acute  and  violent  the  repression,  the  more  obvious  the
presence of this joy is.  This struggle certainly is more perceptible in
Nietzsche’s thought than it is in the thought of most other thinkers.
The smell  can spread itself  everywhere and determine how we see
people, how we talk about people and how we see ourselves.  This
smell produces the violent inner voice that numbs and distorts your
perception of another human being.  This distortion takes place only to
the extent  that  you want it: and this is a wanting where you do not
want to recognise that you want it.   Such is the phenomenology of
smell.   
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